Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Threat

Special Advisory

Notice:

This Special Advisory article is only intended to provide general guidance to assist in efforts to recognise potential VBIED related threats or incidents and based on the recent spate of bombings in the Middle East. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to attack prevention.

Recent VBIED incidents indicate a common modus operandi (MO) that involves a terrorist assault/breaching team armed with small arms/weaponry accompany the VBIED to clear security personnel and gain access to the target.

International terrorist organisations have recently demonstrated the ability to set up and conduct complex and concurrent attacks, against multiple targets. In the May and November Riyadh attacks, terrorists, possibly Al-Qaida, assaulted multiple targets occupied by foreign and Arab workers using vehicles. At least one vehicle in each assault team carried a large explosive charge that was detonated by a suicide bomber.

Post-incident analysis indicates that the attackers drove up to each target killing those guarding the target gates with small arms fire. Vehicles carrying the IEDs were then driven into the target areas and detonated. In one instance it seems that the terrorists attempted to breach the gate security checkpoint by ramming it with a car. It is highly probable that those involved with executing these attacks conducted extensive pre-operational surveillance of the compounds selected. Meticulous planning, to include pre-operational surveillance, is a hallmark of Al-Qaida terror attacks.

Whilst the ability to conduct multiple and concurrent attacks against several targets is not a new MO for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, the manner in which these attacks were conducted indicates a more sophisticated capability. In each attack, multiple armed terrorists were used to eliminate the security elements guarding the compounds so the suicide element could then drive a VBIED to the desired location and detonate it.

Post incident analysis suggests that the terrorist perpetrators may also have fired shots in the air to lure victims out of their dwellings and to windows in order to maximise casualties. The split second timing among the reported three attacks in Riyadh in May 2003 points to the fact that a trained and dedicated team carried out the attack.

Potential VBIED Indicators

Nearly every terrorist attack is preceded by a comprehensive surveillance of the targeted facility. It is highly probable that similar activity preceded the Riyadh, Nasiriya and numerous Baghdad VBIED attacks.

Terrorist surveillance may be either fixed or mobile.

• Fixed surveillance is done from a static position, possibly an adjacent building, business, or other facility. In fixed surveillance scenarios, terrorists may establish themselves in a public location over an extended period of time or choose disguises or occupations such as street vendors, tourists, repair or deliverymen, photographers or even demonstrators. 

• Mobile surveillance usually entails observing and following individual human targets, although it can be conducted against non-mobile facilities (i.e. driving by an Embassy to observe the building or compound). To enhance mobile surveillance, many terrorists have become more adept at progressive surveillance. 

• Progressive surveillance is a technique whereby the terrorist will follow a target for a short period of time from point A to point B, withdraw for a period of time, possibly days or even weeks, and then resume surveillance from point B to point C. This will continue until the terrorist develops target suitability and/or noticeable patterns in the targets movements. This type of transient presence makes the surveillance much more difficult to detect or predict.

More sophisticated surveillance is likely to be accomplished over a long period of time. This tends to disrupt detection techniques and improve the quality of gathered information. Some terrorists are noted to perform surveillance of a target or target area over a period of months or even years.

Terrorists are known to use advances in technology such as modern optoelectronics, communications equipment, video cameras, and other electronic equipment. Such advances include commercial and military night-vision devices, GPS systems, and cellular phones. It should be assumed that many terrorists have access to technological equipment that is easily accessible in terms of cost and availability.

Basic Protective Measures Checklist

Terrorists will to continue to select soft targets for attack - particularly those that will yield a high casualty count. Some examples, though not exhaustive, are:

• Residences,
• Recreational and shopping venues,
• Business buildings and complexes.

All available countermeasures and procedures should be rigorously examined and validated - to include:

• Physical security
• Perimeters and (blast attenuation) distances between security fences and key buildings,
• Anti-vehicle barricades and chicanes. 

It is essential to maintain situational awareness of local and regional events as well as current threats.  This includes but is not limited to:

• Ensure all levels of personnel are notified via briefings, email, voice mail and signage of any changes in threat conditions and preventative measures.
• Encourage personnel to be alert and immediately report any situation that appear to constitute a threat or suspicious activity.
• Encourage personnel to avoid routines; vary times and routes, pre-plan, and keep a low profile, especially during periods of high threat.
• Encourage personnel to take notice and report suspicious packages, vehicles, unattended briefcases, or other unusual materials immediately; instruct them not to handle or attempt to move any such object.
• Encourage personnel to keep their family members and supervisors apprised of their whereabouts.
• Encourage personnel to know emergency exits and stairwells and the locations of assembly points to ensure the safe evacuation of all staff.
• Increase the number of overt security personnel wherever possible.
• Rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, chicanes and roadblocks to change traffic patterns near facilities and cover by vigilant security staff.
• Institute/increase all types of security patrols varying in size, timing, format and routes.
• Implement random staff and security guard shift changes.
• Arrange for security vehicles to be parked randomly near entrances and exits.
• Review disaster preparedness contingency plans and, if not already in place, develop and implement procedures for receiving and acting upon threat information, alert notification procedures, incident response procedures, evacuation procedures, bomb threat procedures, hostage and blockade procedures, consequence and crisis management procedures, accountability procedures, and media procedures.
• Consider the need to conduct internal training exercises.
• Coordinate and establish partnerships with appropriate local authorities and organisations to develop intelligence and information sharing relationships. Instigate intelligence ‘cascade system’.
• Place personnel on standby (roster) for emergency situations.
• Limit the number of facility access points and strictly enforce access control procedures.
• Investigate all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities immediately.
• Consider installing telephone caller ID record phone calls.
• Increase perimeter lighting.
• Deploy visible security cameras and/or motion sensors.
• Remove vegetation in and around perimeters, maintain regularly.
• Institute a forceful vehicle inspection procedure.
• Provide specialist vehicle inspection training and access control specifically for security personnel.
• Deploy explosive detection devices; consider using both electronic and canine explosive detection.
• Conduct vulnerability studies focusing on physical security, structural engineering (blast mitigation) and infrastructure i.e. power, water, and air filtration if feasible.
• Initiate a system to enhance delivery, mail and package screening procedures (both announced and unannounced).

Notice.

This Special Advisory is intended to provide general guidance to assist in efforts to recognise potential VBIED related threats or incidents and based on the recent spate of bombings in the Middle East. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to attack prevention.

Threat Resolution Ltd is experienced in assisting its clients in the identification of bomb threats, conducting threat analysis and advising on pragmatic, effective countermeasures.

For details on how TRLtd can help you contact us.